---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sami AlBanna <sami.albanna@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 2:49 PM
Subject: {Iraq Future:95} Re: Position Paper on the Future of Iraq
To: sami.ramadani@londonmet.ac.uk
Cc: EPJF <EPJF@googlegroups.com>, iraqfuture <iraqfuture@googlegroups.com>
Dear Sami,
Thank you very much for your thoughtful remarks which will definitely help our small group here in DC to improve the content of the statement. I concede that in our rush to get this statement out early to try to influence the debate in Washington, we might have missed or miss-represented some ideas. That is why our small group, here is happy to learn from thoughtful feedback, such as the one you provided, and improve the text going forward to ensure that a more balanced and more progressive solution to Iraq's future.
Let me comment on: "My immediate and biggest initial concern, however, is centered on the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces and the implicit suggestion in the document that a short term continuation of the US-led occupation is beneficial to Iraq."
I am concerned that the document is projecting that image, because non of this that had worked with me believe that is true. Let me explain the context:
1. None my Iraqi colleagues in the team believe that the occupation was legitimate, justified, good for Iraq, or needed to security. I am sorry that the text seems to be projecting a different sense. The team and I will review more closely to make sure that this point is not missed. I am also concerned that another point seems to have been missed which is we all believe that the US carries a moral and legal responsibility for the destruction of Iraq and has a responsibility to support the rebuilding of Iraq.
2. President Obama, using the SOFA, have declared a withdrawal of "US combat troops" by August 2010. He suggested the US will keep 35K-50K troops from August 2010 through December 2011 and I should add, though this was not in his statement, that the US will have to keep roughly 75K-100K of the mercenary and sub-contractors supporting the US presence.
3. President Obama also declared that we will respect the SOFA terms and withdraw all US forces by December 2011.
4. The fact is both declarations by the President are a compromise between two of the three currents prevailing on the debate in Washington. Let me sketch the analysis that the team believes is the situation. The three Forces aligned around the question of withdrawal are:
Forces A) The neo-con and their close allies forces that remain entrenched and formidable in the institutions of the US government and the forest of think tanks and institutes--- i.e. the intellectual sourcing pipeline of the US government--- that surround it in the US, in spite of the election defeat last November.
The position of forces A remain fixated around using US military power not only to subdue Iraq, but if possible to extend that to subdue Iran and Syria and the Palestinian etc., In other words, they are against the withdrawal from Iraq, and they see Iraq as a prize that should be retained and the US should continue to have major bases "forever" in Iraq. This group further dreams that victory has been achieved and their real program of changing the Middle East is now more possible than 2003.
Forces B) The professional institutional government, particularly the national security apparatus which includes the Armed Forces, Intelligence Agencies, the State Department, and many of the intellectuals feed surrounding the permanent government.
This trend is against the total withdrawal, but accepts to a significant draw down, and believe that the SFA provides a mechanism that can be activated to draft a new SOFA after the Nov 2010 mid-term elections. This logic states that the Democrats can claim that they have been successful implemented the promise of President Obama to withdraw in 16 months, in his speech, he is doing it in 18 months, which a couple of months before that mid-term elections. In short, in spite of President Obama to completely withdraw from Iraq by December 2011, the issue is open.
Forces A and Forces B are aligned now on this issue and they both see there will be an opportunity to revise the total withdrawal decision after the Nov 2010 elections, particularly they feel that there are a number of Iraqi parties that are demanding for the US to stay like the Kurdish parties, the Al-Hakim group, and, suspect even Al-Hashimi Sunni group. I also suspect that Al-Maliki, ultimately, will not oppose the permanent stay of US forces, but now he is milking the strong Iraqi national sentiments for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
Forces C) I think this a strong majority in the US electorate with very strong representation in Congress after the Nov 2008 elections, particularly in the house where there is a near majority in favor of total immediate withdrawal. I also think that President Obama started his electoral campaign being strongly in this camp. Now he has to deal with mostly Forces A and B on a daily basis, and given the declining economic conditions whereby he has to relay mostly on the permanent government establishment to carry forward his plans, he had to compromise and the compromise is really a delay until after August 2010.
The position here is simple. Iraq was a strategic blunder and an unjustified war. We should withdraw ASAP and let the Iraqis rule their lives. I believe that this broad majority, however, is not as well organized around this issue as indeed either Forces A and Forces B. We need to find a mechanism to mobilize them in the US.
5. Our attempt is to encourage Forces C to keep the pressure on the administration, otherwise we will meet a condition by Sept 2010 whereby the forces will be aligned to extend the withdrawal. Our attempt also is to call on the Iraqi forces to explore ways of non-sectarian conciliation in the interest of evolving toward some peaceful resolution. The chances are today without such a reconciliation that we will face an escalating state of violence in 2010, particularly after Nov 2010, which will provide justifications for Forces A and B to extend the occupation.
Sami: I need to study your message more deeply because it has many valuable inputs to explore with my colleagues the ways to strengthen this document.
In friendship with deep appreciation,
Sami AlBanna
From: Sami AlBanna <sami.albanna@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 2:49 PM
Subject: {Iraq Future:95} Re: Position Paper on the Future of Iraq
To: sami.ramadani@londonmet.ac.uk
Cc: EPJF <EPJF@googlegroups.com>, iraqfuture <iraqfuture@googlegroups.com>
Dear Sami,
Thank you very much for your thoughtful remarks which will definitely help our small group here in DC to improve the content of the statement. I concede that in our rush to get this statement out early to try to influence the debate in Washington, we might have missed or miss-represented some ideas. That is why our small group, here is happy to learn from thoughtful feedback, such as the one you provided, and improve the text going forward to ensure that a more balanced and more progressive solution to Iraq's future.
Let me comment on: "My immediate and biggest initial concern, however, is centered on the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces and the implicit suggestion in the document that a short term continuation of the US-led occupation is beneficial to Iraq."
I am concerned that the document is projecting that image, because non of this that had worked with me believe that is true. Let me explain the context:
1. None my Iraqi colleagues in the team believe that the occupation was legitimate, justified, good for Iraq, or needed to security. I am sorry that the text seems to be projecting a different sense. The team and I will review more closely to make sure that this point is not missed. I am also concerned that another point seems to have been missed which is we all believe that the US carries a moral and legal responsibility for the destruction of Iraq and has a responsibility to support the rebuilding of Iraq.
2. President Obama, using the SOFA, have declared a withdrawal of "US combat troops" by August 2010. He suggested the US will keep 35K-50K troops from August 2010 through December 2011 and I should add, though this was not in his statement, that the US will have to keep roughly 75K-100K of the mercenary and sub-contractors supporting the US presence.
3. President Obama also declared that we will respect the SOFA terms and withdraw all US forces by December 2011.
4. The fact is both declarations by the President are a compromise between two of the three currents prevailing on the debate in Washington. Let me sketch the analysis that the team believes is the situation. The three Forces aligned around the question of withdrawal are:
Forces A) The neo-con and their close allies forces that remain entrenched and formidable in the institutions of the US government and the forest of think tanks and institutes--- i.e. the intellectual sourcing pipeline of the US government--- that surround it in the US, in spite of the election defeat last November.
The position of forces A remain fixated around using US military power not only to subdue Iraq, but if possible to extend that to subdue Iran and Syria and the Palestinian etc., In other words, they are against the withdrawal from Iraq, and they see Iraq as a prize that should be retained and the US should continue to have major bases "forever" in Iraq. This group further dreams that victory has been achieved and their real program of changing the Middle East is now more possible than 2003.
Forces B) The professional institutional government, particularly the national security apparatus which includes the Armed Forces, Intelligence Agencies, the State Department, and many of the intellectuals feed surrounding the permanent government.
This trend is against the total withdrawal, but accepts to a significant draw down, and believe that the SFA provides a mechanism that can be activated to draft a new SOFA after the Nov 2010 mid-term elections. This logic states that the Democrats can claim that they have been successful implemented the promise of President Obama to withdraw in 16 months, in his speech, he is doing it in 18 months, which a couple of months before that mid-term elections. In short, in spite of President Obama to completely withdraw from Iraq by December 2011, the issue is open.
Forces A and Forces B are aligned now on this issue and they both see there will be an opportunity to revise the total withdrawal decision after the Nov 2010 elections, particularly they feel that there are a number of Iraqi parties that are demanding for the US to stay like the Kurdish parties, the Al-Hakim group, and, suspect even Al-Hashimi Sunni group. I also suspect that Al-Maliki, ultimately, will not oppose the permanent stay of US forces, but now he is milking the strong Iraqi national sentiments for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
Forces C) I think this a strong majority in the US electorate with very strong representation in Congress after the Nov 2008 elections, particularly in the house where there is a near majority in favor of total immediate withdrawal. I also think that President Obama started his electoral campaign being strongly in this camp. Now he has to deal with mostly Forces A and B on a daily basis, and given the declining economic conditions whereby he has to relay mostly on the permanent government establishment to carry forward his plans, he had to compromise and the compromise is really a delay until after August 2010.
The position here is simple. Iraq was a strategic blunder and an unjustified war. We should withdraw ASAP and let the Iraqis rule their lives. I believe that this broad majority, however, is not as well organized around this issue as indeed either Forces A and Forces B. We need to find a mechanism to mobilize them in the US.
5. Our attempt is to encourage Forces C to keep the pressure on the administration, otherwise we will meet a condition by Sept 2010 whereby the forces will be aligned to extend the withdrawal. Our attempt also is to call on the Iraqi forces to explore ways of non-sectarian conciliation in the interest of evolving toward some peaceful resolution. The chances are today without such a reconciliation that we will face an escalating state of violence in 2010, particularly after Nov 2010, which will provide justifications for Forces A and B to extend the occupation.
Sami: I need to study your message more deeply because it has many valuable inputs to explore with my colleagues the ways to strengthen this document.
In friendship with deep appreciation,
Sami AlBanna
2009/3/11 Sami Ramadani <sami.ramadani@londonmet.ac.uk>
Dear Sami,
Many thanks for this and the effort you have been putting into the whole process of achieving consensus on Iraq and highlighting the plight of its long-suffering people.
The document deserves careful attention and consideration, which I will do during the coming days. Meanwhile, even a cursory reading reveals a mature approach to many of Iraq's seemingly insurmountable problems. Many of the proposals and recommendations are very sensible and realistic. My immediate and biggest initial concern, however, is centred on the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces and the implicit suggestion in the document that a short term continuation of the US-led occupation is beneficial to Iraq.
Thinking aloud: my starting point on post-occupation Iraq is anchored on the premise that non of Iraq's major problems and tragedies could be resolved or ameliorated without the immediate ending of the occupation and all its works. This does not mean that Iraq's problems will be resolved once the occupation ends, but it does mean that the Iraqi people could begin to try to resolve the myriad of complex problems facing them without the visible and invisible hands of the occupation.
The military occupation has immeasurably strengthened US influence and varied forms of presence at all levels in Iraqi society. The biggest embassy in the world, for example, needs to be shut down. If the US is willing to respect the independence and sovereignty of Iraq, then a modest embassy similar to many others is more than sufficient. War reparations are also due. The TAJ should also look into the US-led war crimes and the war of aggression itself. The proposed oil law should be scrapped...
The occupation and US-led presence in Iraq is the poison that has replaced and added to the Saddamist poison inflicting in Iraq's social, political and economic life and fabric. The poison needs to be removed first.
Reading the above I see that the language is emotive. But whatever the form of words, the meaning is all important in my view.
Thanks again for shepherding this effort and debate.
Best,
Sami
**************************************************
Sami Ramadani,
Department of Applied Social Sciences,
London Metropolitan University, City Campus,
Old Castle Street, London, E1 7NT
Tel: 020 7320 1280
Fax: 020 7320 1034
Email: Sami.Ramadani@londonmet.ac.uk
**************************************************
Sami AlBanna wrote:Please find attached a statement on the Future of Iraq developed by a group of Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans living in the Washington, DC area.
The statement is open for evolution based on feedback and discussions. Your feedback will be appreciated.
Sami AlBanna
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